But it's only a theory! or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Uncertainty
No
theory ever agrees with all the facts in its domain, yet it is not always the
theory that is to blame.
—Paul
Feyerabend
When listening to debates between climate activists
(i.e. those who believe in anthropogenic climate change and believe that
something should be done about it) and climate skeptics or deniers (i.e. those
who doubt or deny the existence of climate change), a crucial term often gets
thrown about—a term that is well-known in both the scientific and
non-scientific communities, but that means different things to both
groups. This term assumes center stage
in reasonings and arguments concerning what to do about climate change, what
the proper response should be, and whether climate models are reliable. It hangs in midair like the axe of an
executioner with poor hand-eye coordination, threatening to fall on either side
of the debate, hewing popular response in a particular direction.
This term is uncertainty.
Climate skeptics and contrarians
often appeal to uncertainty when arguing against climate action, by which I mean
adaptive and mitigative measures to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions. There’s too much uncertainty to justify taking action, is the
general shape of this argument. As John
Cook shows in the following comic, this argument isn’t sound in the framework
of plausible risk assessment:
Climate
scientists like Stephan Lewandowski argue that contrarians have it backwards,so to speak: “in the case of the
climate system, it is very clear that greater uncertainty will make things even
worse. This means that we can never say that there is too much uncertainty for
us to act. If you appeal to uncertainty to make a policy decision the
legitimate conclusion is to increase the urgency of mitigation.” In terms
of risk assessment, doing nothing is an irrational decision in that the cost of
doing nothing has the potential to drastically outweigh the cost of taking
action.
In
other words, climate activists and skeptics disagree over precisely what the
concept of uncertainty signifies within the scientific debate. No scientific theory is perfect, but that
doesn’t mean the theory as a whole is the source of controversy within the
scientific community: “scientists spend far more time talking about gaps than
non-gaps,” writes Julia Galef, “creating
a skewed impression of how much contention actually exists. People primed to see controversy are liable
to confuse scientists’ disagreement over a theory’s finer points for
disagreement over the theory itself.” Galef
suggests that the tendency toward disagreement between scientists and non-specialists
(or laypersons) is connected to the American values of pluralism and respect
for diverse opinions. Agree to
disagree might be the American way, but it’s not the scientific way; non-scientists
might say they don’t believe in evolution, but for a scientist it’s not a
matter of belief. For scientists, evolution
is all around us, and there’s no viable—meaning scientifically-testable—alternative. The theory of evolution isn’t a personal
belief.
I
recall a moment early in Boston University’s course on climate change (which I had
the good fortune to assist with this semester) when one of the faculty, a
biologist, articulated the discrepancy in how people understand the word theory.
For non-scientists, theories are
selective: you can opt out of them if you wish because they’re only
theories. For scientists, theories are
obligatory: without any other viable framework, you have no choice but to accept
the theory. The only other option is to
enter the realm of fantasy. There is no
such thing as a theory with no gaps in applicability (although some physicists are searching for such a theory, known as a theory of everything), and such gaps aren’t cause for throwing the
baby out with the bathwater. The
reigning theory in contemporary physics—quantum mechanics—remains full of inexplicable
inconsistencies and unknowns. There are
uncertainties, but that doesn’t mean the theory itself isn’t
viable. In fact, uncertainty lies at the
very core of quantum science.
As
Galef says, uncertainty is a feature of science, not a bug. It’s fundamental to the continued inquiries
into a theory, not a reason for its wholesale dismantling in favor of less substantial
beliefs. What’s more, it’s imperative
that we realize—all of us, not just the scientists—that a major source of
uncertainty in science, particularly climate change, is humanity itself:
“The biggest uncertainty in climate forecasting is always us,” Umair Irfan
writes in a piece for Vox assessing the recent federal report on climatechange; “What will humanity actually do
about climate change?” The remarkable
irony of this statement is that the reason humanity is such a source of
uncertainty is that we disagree over what uncertainty signifies. How’s that for a feedback loop? So many see uncertainty in the forecasting
models and think Well, it’s not worth doing anything because there’s so much
uncertainty, without realizing that their attitude is reinforcing the very
uncertainty they’re looking at.
Alternatively, if we were to take action, to reduce GHG emissions and pursue
renewable energy, we would reduce that uncertainty, leading to forecasting models
that actually contain less uncertainty and predict less-extreme variations.
When
James Hansen made his famous 1988 projections, he suffered a slew of criticisms
after subsequent years revealed measurements that didn’t match his models; but his
critics failed to look at the big picture.
Take a look at the original graph, which featured three scenarios:
The actual temperature measurements (the black
line) are much lower than Hansen’s scenario A projection, and mostly lower than
scenario B. Not only that, but look at
how the peaks and valleys don’t match up.
Seems pretty off, doesn’t it? The
problem is that these scenarios aren’t definitive predictions. Each scenario is based on a different set of
assumptions, meaning Hansen is demonstrating potential alternative futures. The most important features of these
projections aren’t their differences from the observed (or measured)
temperature, but their overall trajectory: they all climb alongside one
another. Hansen’s theory may not have
been perfect—it certainly has its uncertainties—but it hasn’t been disproved. To the contrary, it’s been confirmed.
The
different scenarios assume different conditions, including humanity’s
response. When we externalize uncertainty,
perceiving it as an alien and uncontrollable aspect of the natural systems
surrounding us, we cancel our own agency.
We deny the role that we play in uncertainty, and the power we have to alter
it. I’m guilty of this myself. Most of us are. The point I’m trying to make is this: the disagreement
between climate activists and skeptics over the meaning of uncertainty in forecasting
models produces that very uncertainty.
We are the cause of the rationalization for our inaction. I’d call it a self-fulfilling prophecy except
we actually have the power to change it.
If we looked at uncertainty and saw it not as proof of a theory’s flaw
but as a sign of its usefulness and applicability, we could take action to
effectively reduce it. We could realize
our agency within the bounds of uncertainty.
Again, how’s that for
a feedback loop?
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